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In this paper we model optimal decumulation of retirement wealth. Prior research has shown
that in simple stylized settings full annuitization of available wealth upon retirement is optimal
for individuals who only face uncertainty about their time of death. Yaari (1965) shows that risk
averse agents with intertemporally separable utility who are only exposed to longevity risk, and
with no desire to leave a bequest, ﬁnd it optimal to hold their entire wealth in annuities if these are
actuarially fair. This argument is extended by Davidoff, Brown, and Diamond (2005) to cases with
more risk factors and more general utility functions. Full annuitization is optimal in these models
since the annuities generate a mortality credit that cannot be captured otherwise.
In the literature the policy recommendation that all pension wealth should be annuitized has
been challenged. These papers are partly motivated by the observation that very few individuals
voluntarilypurchaseannuityproducts when theyreach theretirement age(B¨ utler and Teppa(2007)
and Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky, and Brown (1999)). This empirical fact is often referred to as
the annuity puzzle. In this paper we focus on two of the main factors that have been put forward
to challenge the claim that full annuitization is optimal. The ﬁrst factor in our analysis is that
annuity menus are typically incomplete. In many cases only nominal annuities are available rather
than annuities which hedge inﬂation risk or which give exposure to equity markets. Such incom-
plete annuity menus have been claimed to reduce annuity demand (Milevsky and Young (2007a),
Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, and Dus (2008), and Koijen, Nijman, and Werker (2009b)). The second
factor emphasizesthat annuitiesare irreversibledueto adverseselectionand peopleface borrowing
constraints. This implies that annuities cannot be sold or borrowed against if liquidity is needed
because of unforeseen shocks, for instance in health costs or breakdown of a durable consumption
good. Such background risk has also been claimed to reduce demand for annuities (Turra and
Mitchell (2008) and Pang and Warshawsky (2010)).
We analyze a comprehensive stochastic life cycle model from retirement onwards. An indi-
vidual optimally allocates a fraction of wealth to an annuity at age 65. Every period an agent
decides how much to consume and to save, and how to allocate liquid wealth between stocks and a
riskless bond. The model includes the most important risks a retiree faces, namely longevity risk,
background risk, inﬂation risk, and capital market risk. Recently developed numerical methods are
used to solve the model.
We ﬁnd that almost full annuitization is optimal irrespective of whether real or only nominal
annuities are available. Neither incomplete annuity markets nor background risk lead to a sizeable
reduction of optimal annuitization levels. Individuals allocate approximately their entire wealth to
annuities and save out of their annuity income to insure against shocks. If background risk hits
them the liquid wealth is used as a buffer and consumption is temporarily reduced to rebuild the
1buffer. So incomplete annuity markets do reduce utility, but not the demand for annuities.
During retirement agents accumulate a sizeable amount of liquid wealth. The median savings
account is at its maximum (in real terms) around age 84 and amounts to approximately 25% of
initial wealth. Saving during retirement is driven by four factors: (1) redistribution of consumption
to later periods when the real value of the nominal annuity income is low. Furthermore people
save to hedge against (2) inﬂation risk and (3) background risk. Finally, wealth accumulation
allows people to beneﬁt from the (4) equity premium. We disentangle these four reasons and ﬁnd
that, the anticipatory motive to save (1) is most important. Furthermore inﬂation risk induces a
large amount of precautionary savings; it increases the amount accumulated in the savings account
by 50%. Expenses due to background risk are a substantial reason for saving, but lesser so than
inﬂation risk. The possibility to gain equity exposure does not increase savings signiﬁcantly.
Similar to our paper Davidoff, Brown, and Diamond (2005) also examine the effect of incom-
plete annuity markets on annuity demand. They ﬁnd that the low annuity purchases in reality can
only be reconciled by a large mismatch between the desired consumption path and available an-
nuity income paths. In their paper they determine the optimal demand for a real annuity, when
the optimal real consumption pattern is not ﬂat. They assume a habit formation utility function,
which creates the mismatch between the desired real consumption path (U-shaped or upward slop-
ing) and available income path (ﬂat). While incomplete annuity markets do explain the lack of
full annuitization, they cannot explain the low levels of annuitization found in reality. Our paper
examines a similar question but approaches it from a different angle. We assume a desire for a
smooth consumption path in real terms and show that, even if only nominal annuities are available,
full annuitization is still optimal.
Another related paper, Pang and Warshawsky (2010), examines the effect of health risk, but
not incomplete annuity markets, on the annuitization decision. In their set up additional annuities
can be bought every year and they restrict their analysis to real annuities. They ﬁnd that early in
retirement it is optimal to annuitize nothing of your wealth and that from age seventy onwards the
optimal annuitization fraction increases with age. Full annuitization is only reached for people
in their early eighties. In contrast to their results, we ﬁnd that full annuitization is optimal at re-
tirement, allowing people to proﬁt from the full mortality credit. The difference in results is due
to their model setup, namely that additional annuities can be bought every year. Pang and War-
shawsky (2010) state that annuities represent a speciﬁc asset class with its own unique risk and
return proﬁle. They model the annuitization decision essentially as a portfolio allocation decision
between bonds, equity, and annuities. Since the mortality credit increases with age, an annuity
bought at a later age earns a higher return than an annuity bought at age 65. In that case individuals
ﬁnd it optimal to ﬁrst invest in equity to receive the risk premium, but eventually annuities crowd
out equity. Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, and Dus (2008) and Horneff, Maurer, and Stamos (2008)
2also ﬁnd that the optimal annuitization level increases with age. In contrast to these studies we
ﬁnd that (almost) full annuitization at retirement is optimal. The difference between our study and
those mentioned above is that we assume that annuitization can only take place at retirement. We
make this assumption for various reasons. First of all in several countries the decision whether to
annuitize your pension account or take a lump sum is, due to the tax legislation, to take place at
retirement. Furthermore mandatory annuitization of a fraction of wealth at younger ages reduces
adverse selection costs that are generated when the annuity date can be chosen. These adverse
selection costs are typically ignored in the papers referred to above. A third reason for our as-
sumption of a single conversion opportunity at retirement is that in reality people make ﬁnancial
decisions very infrequently rather than annually. Finally Agarwal, Driscoll, Gabaix, and Laibson
(2009) show that the capability of individuals to make ﬁnancial decisions declines dramatically at
higher ages, hence it seems optimal to make these decisions at younger ages when a person is still
able to do so.
In our model we treat the magnitude of background risk as independent of age, which seems
realistic for most European countries. A number of papers have analyzed annuity demand from
a US perspective where health expenses are in general only partially covered by insurance poli-
cies (Turra and Mitchell (2008) and Sinclair and Smetters (2004)). Ameriks, Caplin, Laufer, and
Van Nieuwerburgh (2009) ﬁnd that out of pocket medical expenses reduce the optimal annuity
demand. In contrast, Peijnenburg, Nijman, and Werker (2009) conclude that in most cases health
cost risk does notdecrease optimalannuitylevelsand whether fullannuitizationis optimaldepends
crucially on the timing of the medical expenses. In case the health costs can already be extremely
high very early in retirement, then there is not enough time to build up a buffer to insure against
this health cost risk.
Furthermore we ﬁnd that adding variable annuities to the menu does not increase welfare sig-
niﬁcantly. This result contrasts the ﬁndings in Koijen, Nijman, and Werker (2009b) and Brown,
Mitchell, and Poterba (1999), because we assume that agents can invest in equity during retire-
ment. In aforementioned papers, investment in equity, other than via the variable annuity, is not
allowed during the retirement period. Hence the only manner to get the equity premium is via the
variable annuity, which results in higher welfare gains from variable annuities, compared to our
setup. Furthermore, Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, and Stamos (2009) also ﬁnds higher welfare gains,
but as stated before; they assume that additional annuities can be bought every year. Hence agents
invest partly in equity early in retirement, and gradually increase the allocation to annuities.
In this paper we ignore a number of other potential drivers of annuity demand. These include
thepresence ofloads in annuityprices (see for instanceMitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky, and Brown
(1999)), private information on health status (Turra and Mitchell (2008)), high means tested bene-
ﬁts (B¨ utler, Peijnenburg, and Staubli (2009)), high pre-annuitized wealth levels (Dushi and Webb
3(2004)), and family composition (Brown and Poterba (2000) and Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981)).
These extensions could be considered in subsequent work. Furthermore, several behavioral expla-
nations have been put forward, for example framing of the annuity choice (Brown, Kling, Mul-
lainathan, and Wrobel (2008), Gazzale and Walker (2009), and Agnew, Anderson, Gerlach, and
Szykman (2008)), mental accounting (Hu and Scott (2007)), and complexityof theannuity product
(Brown (2007)).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the individual’s pref-
erences, the setup of the ﬁnancial market, the benchmark parameters, and the numerical method
to solve the dynamic programming problem. Section 3 contains detailed results for the benchmark
case. Robustness checks are subsequently performed in section 4 and in particular, we calculate
bounds on a possible bequest motive and default risk of the annuity provider for which our results
still hold. Section 5 concludes.
2 The retirement phase life cycle model
2.1 Individual’s preferences and constraints
We consider a life cycle investor during retirement with age t ∈ 1,...,T, where t = 1 is the
retirement age and T is the maximum age possible. The individual’s preferences are presented by
a time-separable, constant relative risk aversion utility function over real consumption, Ct. More


















where β is the time preference discount factor, γ denotes the level of risk aversion, and Ct is the
real amount of wealth consumed at the beginning of period t. The probability of surviving to age t,
conditional on having lived to period t−1, is indicated by pt. We denote the nominal consumption
as Ct = CtΠt, where Πt is the price index at time t.
The individual invests a fraction wt in equity, which yields a gross nominal return Rt+1 in year
t + 1. The remainder of liquid wealth is invested in a riskless bond and the return on this bond is
denoted by R
f
t . The intertemporal budget constraint of the individual is, in nominal terms, equal
to
Wt+1 = (Wt + Yt − Bt − Ct)(1 + R
f
t + (Rt+1 − R
f
t )wt), (2)
where Wt is the amount of ﬁnancial wealth at time t, Yt is the annual nominal annuity income, and
the expenses due to background risk are indicated by Bt. The timing of decisions is as follows.
4First the individual receives annuity income and incurs expenses due to background risk. After this
exogenous shock, the agent decides how much to consume and subsequently invests the remaining
liquid wealth. In case the annuity income plus wealth at the beginning of the period is insufﬁcient
to pay the expenses and consume, the individual receives a subsistence consumption level. In our
benchmark speciﬁcation this happens in 0.02% of the cases. The decision frequency is annually.
The individual faces a number of constraints on the consumption and investment decisions.
First, we assume that the retiree faces borrowing and short-sales constraints
wt ≥ 0 and ι
′wt ≤ 1. (3)
Second, we impose that the investor is liquidity constrained
Ct ≤ Wt, (4)
which implies that the individual cannot borrow against future annuity income to increase con-
sumption today.
2.2 Financial market
The asset menu of an investor consists of a riskless one-year nominal bond and a risky stock. The
return on the stock is normally distributed with an annual mean nominal return µR and a standard
deviation σR. The interest rate dynamics are described by an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process
drt = −ar(rt − µr)dt + σrdZ
(r)
t , (5)
where rt is the instantaneous short rate and ar indicates the mean reversion coefﬁcient. µr is the
long run mean of the instantaneous short rate, σr denotes the instantaneous standard deviation of
the short interest rate, and dZ
(r)
t are the innovations to the interest rate. The yield on a risk-free










where A(h) and B(h) are scalars and h is the maturity of the bond. The real yield is equal to the
nominal yield minus expected inﬂation and an inﬂation risk premium.
In our market, inﬂation is modeled as follows. For the instantaneous expected inﬂation rate we
assume
dπt = −aπ(πt − µπ)dt + σπdZ
(π)
t , (7)
5where aπ is the mean reversion parameter, µπ is long run expected inﬂation, σπ is the standard
deviation of shocks to expected inﬂation, and dZ
(π)
t are the innovations to the expected inﬂation.
Subsequently the price index Π follows from





t are the innovations to the price index. We assume there is a positive relation between





t is positive. The parameters we use are described in Section 2.3.
We consider single-premiumimmediate life-contingent annuities with real or nominal payouts.
Consequently, the annuity income is given by
Y = PR0A
−1, (9)
where PR0 is the premium and A is the annuity factor. The single premium is equal to the present
value of expected beneﬁts paid to the annuitant and we assume an actuarially fair annuity. The












0 is the time zero yield on a zero coupon bond maturing at time t. The interest rate term
structure that is applied is either nominal or real depending on the type of annuity. We study in
Section 4 the effect of loads on the annuitization decision.
The annuity factor for a variable annuity payout is similar to equation (10), but R
(t)
0 is equal to
the assumed interest rate (AIR), which is ﬁxed. The annual annuity income depends on the return
of the portfolio backing the annuity, RA











The AIR determines whether, in expectation, the annuity payout stream increases or decreases
over time. The annuity income is constant over time in case the AIR is equal to the return of the
underlying portfolio, RA
t . If the AIR is below RA
t , then the nominal income stream is upwards
sloping over time.
In Figure 1 we display the mean annuity income in real terms for various types of annuities.
Naturally the real income stream from the real annuity (solid line) is ﬂat, and throughout this paper
we normalize this to unity. This way of normalization allows for a simple comparison of various
6strategies. Furthermore, we see that the real income stream from the nominal annuity is decreasing
over time, which is the dashed-dotted line. Early in retirement the real income generated from the
nominal annuity is higher than from the real annuity. The income from the nominal annuity in
real terms decreases over time from about 1.4 to 0.5. In addition we see that the AIR has a large
inﬂuence on the payout pattern of the variable annuity. When the AIR equals the expected return
on the portfolio backing the annuity minus the expected inﬂation, the expected annuity income in
real terms is ﬂat. If we look at the dashed line which is the income pattern from a variable annuity
with an AIR of 2%, we see in expectation an increasing income in real terms.




























Variable annuity − AIR 2%  
Variable annuity − AIR 4.52% (expected real return )
Real annuity
Nominal annuity
Figure 1: The annuity income levels in real terms for various types of annuities
Theﬁguredisplaysthe annuityincomeoverthe lifecyclein realterms generatedbyfourtypesofannuities. We display
the real income from a nominal, real and variable annuity. In case of the variable annuity we show the results for an
assumed interest rate of 2% and 4.52%. The latter AIR equals the expected nominal return on the portfolio backing
the annuity minus expected inﬂation.
We postulate that the expenses due to background risk are lognormally distributed with an
annual mean µB and a standard deviation σB. Furthermore we assume that these expenses do not
exhibit autocorrelation.
2.3 Benchmark parameters
The previous sections present the speciﬁcation of the life cycle preferences and the ﬁnancial mar-
ket. In this section we set the parameter values for the benchmark case. In accordance with Pang
and Warshawsky (2010) and Yogo (2009) we set β, the time preference discount factor, equal to
0.96. The risk aversion coefﬁcient γ is assumed equal to 5 for ease of comparison, since this is
equivalent to Pang and Warshawsky (2010) and close to the parameter choice of Yogo (2009) and
7Ameriks, Caplin, Laufer, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2009). Initial wealth is such that, if the indi-
vidual would annuitize fully in real annuities, the (real) income for the rest of the lifespan equals
unity. We call this real annuity income if 100% is invested in a real annuity the Full Real Annuity
Income (FRAI). The mean expenses due to background risk are 10% of the FRAI, with a standard
deviation of 7%. Furthermore we choose a subsistence consumption level of about 25% of the
FRAI.1
The equity return is normally distributed with a mean annual nominal return of 8% and an an-
nual standard deviation of 20%. The mean instantaneous short rate is set equal to 4%, the standard
deviation to 1%, and the mean reversion parameter to 0.15. The inﬂation risk premium to deter-
mine the real yield is 0.5%. The correlation between the instantaneous short rate with the expected
inﬂation is 0.40. The parameters on the inﬂation dynamics are taken from Koijen, Nijman, and
Werker (2009a). They ﬁnd a mean inﬂation of 3.48%, a standard deviation of the instantaneous
inﬂation rate of 1.38%, a standard deviation of the price index of 1.3%, and a mean reversion coef-
ﬁcient equals 0.165. The assumed interest rate is equal to 4%, which is similar to Horneff, Maurer,
Mitchell, and Stamos (2009) and Koijen, Nijman, and Werker (2009b).2 The portfolio linked to
variable annuity consists100% of equity. Furthermore we will perform robustness checks to assess
whether the results hold for different values for the individual preference parameters and ﬁnancial
market parameters. Time ranges from t = 1 to time T, which corresponds to age 65 and 100
respectively. The survival probabilities are the current male survival probabilities in the US and
are obtained from the Human Mortality Database.3 We assume a certain death at age 100.
2.4 Numerical method for solving the life cycle problem
Due to the richness and complexity of the model it cannot be solved analytically hence we employ
numerical techniques instead. We use the method proposed by Brandt, Goyal, Santa-Clara, and
Stroud (2005) and Carroll (2006) with several extensions added by Koijen, Nijman, and Werker
(2009a). Brandt, Goyal, Santa-Clara, and Stroud (2005) adopt a simulation-based method which
can deal with many exogenous state variables. In our case Xt = (R
f
t ,πt) is the relevant exogenous
state variable. Wealth acts as an endogenous state variable. For this reason, following Carroll
1The dollar equivalents of these numbers are as follows. Median wealth at age 65 is $335,000, which is the to-
tal of non-annuitized and annuitized wealth for a single, estimated in Pang and Warshawsky (2010). The annuity
income if the entire wealth is invested in a real annuity is $22,645 (which is then normalized to unity). The subsis-
tence consumption level is $6000. Ameriks, Caplin, Laufer, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2009) note that the payments
under the government’s Supplemental Security Income are about $7000 per year and they use $5000 as the minimum
consumption level. The mean expenses due to background risk are about $2250 and the standard deviation is $1600.
2The US National Association of Insurance Commissionaires requires that the AIR may not be higher than 5%.
Furthermore Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, and Stamos (2009) remark that 4% is commonly used in the US insurance
industry.
3We refer for further information to the website, www.mortality.org.
8(2006), we specify a grid for wealth after (annuity) income, expenses due to background risk,
and consumption. As a result, it is not required to do numerical rootﬁnding to ﬁnd the optimal
consumption decision.
The optimization problem is solved via dynamic programming and we proceed backwards to
ﬁnd the optimal investment and consumption strategy. In the last period the individual consumes









The value function satisﬁes the Bellman equation at all other points in time,
Vt(Wt,R
f
















t+1 (Rt+1 − R
f
t )/Πt+1) = 0, (14)
where C∗
t+1 denotes the optimal real consumption level. Because we solve the optimization prob-
lem via backwards recursion we know C∗
t+1 at time t+1. Furthermore we simulate the exogenous
state variables for N=1000 trajectories and T time periods hence we can calculate the realizations
of the Euler conditions, C
∗−γ
t+1 (Rt+1 − R
f
t )/Πt+1. We regress these realizations on a polynomial













In additionweemployafurtherextensionintroducedinKoijen, Nijman, andWerker (2009a). They
foundthat theregressioncoefﬁcientsθh aresmoothfunctionsoftheasset weightsandconsequently
we approximate the regression coefﬁcients θh by projecting them further on polynomial expansion
in the asset weights:
θ
′
h ≃ g(w)ψ. (16)




′ = 0. (17)
93 Results for the benchmark case
3.1 Optimal annuitization strategies at retirement
As shown by Davidoff, Brown, and Diamond (2005) full annuitization is optimal if the annuity
market is complete. However, the literature asserts that this might not be the case if no annuity is
available which offers equity exposure or provides inﬂation protection and/or the agent is exposed
to background risk. Figure 2 presents the certainty equivalent consumption for various levels of
annuitization, conditional on optimal consumption and asset allocation strategies. In all cases
(almost) full annuitization is optimal. Hence the optimal annuity demand is not lowered, even
though annuity markets are incomplete and agents face background risk.
The welfare gains over no annuitization are substantial. For instance, in case real annuities are
available, but there is no background risk, full annuitization leads to an increase in annual certainty
equivalentconsumptionfrom 57% of the FRAI to 100% of theFRAI.4 If no annuitiesare available,
welfare is thus reduced by about 43%. The magnitude of these welfare gains are in line with the
ﬁndings in Davidoff, Brown, and Diamond (2005) and Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky, and Brown
(1999). For many individuals part of their wealth will be annuitized for institutional reasons, for
example in the form of social beneﬁt payments or Deﬁned Beneﬁt pensions. The results show that
an increase in the level of annuitization from say 50% to 100% also brings about a very substantial
welfare gain.
Markets may be considered to be even more incomplete when only nominal annuities are avail-
able. Individuals might be induced to decrease annuity demand to protect against inﬂation risk and
to shift income in early retirement to later years when the real value of the annuity income is lower.
The dotted line displays the certainty equivalent consumption when an agent can only buy a nom-
inal annuity and does not face background risk. Again we ﬁnd that full annuitization is optimal.
This implies that the fact that the annuity market is incomplete does not have a material impact on
the optimal annuitization level, given that we allow saving from annuity income.
The results on the optimal annuity demand are also hardly affected by the presence of back-
ground risk. The solid line in Figure 2 shows that (almost) full annuitization is optimal in this case
as well. Obviously, background risk reduces the attainable utility levels, but the curves are still
essentially increasing: more annuitization leads to more utility. Later we will see that the main dif-
ference with the case without background risk is that the agent accumulates wealth out of annuity
income to cover shocks in background risk and plans consumption to rebuild these buffers when
needed.
4As described in Section 2.3 we set, for ease of comparison, the initial wealth such that, if the individual would
annuitize fully in real annuities, the (real) income for the rest of the lifespan equals unity. We call this annuity income,
the Full Real Annuity Income (FRAI).










































Real annuity − with background risk
Real annuity − without background risk
Nominal annuity − with background risk
Nominal annuity − without background risk
Figure 2: Optimal annuitization levels
Theﬁguredisplays the certaintyequivalentconsumptionforthe life cyclemodelwith andwithoutbackgroundrisk and
nominalorrealannuityincome. Equityinvestmentofliquidwealthis includedin themodel. Theoptimalannuitization
strategy is the level that generates the highest certainty equivalent consumption. All numbers are relative to the FRAI,
which is the real annuity income if 100% is invested in a real annuity.
Pang and Warshawsky (2010) ﬁnd that in a life cycle model with health costs as background
risk, annuity demand increases due to background risk. The reason for this contrasting result is
that they do not model annuitization as a one-timedecision that needs to be made at retirement age,
but optimize annually over the equity-bond-annuity portfolio. In effect, the annuitization decision
is modeled as a repeated portfolio allocation decision. Health costs are an additional risk factor
which drives households to shift demand from risky to riskless assets, namely from equity to bonds
and annuities. Then as a consequence of the superiority of annuities over bonds, annuity demand
increases due to health costs. For the reasons outlined in the introduction, we model annuitization
as an irreversible decision at retirement and ﬁnd that it is optimal to annuitize fully if agents save
adequately out of the annuity income. The beneﬁts of insurance against longevity risk and the
mortality credit outweigh the reduction in liquidity and less ability to get equity exposure at short
horizons.





































median optimal consumption if 100% is invested in a real annuity
median optimal consumption if no wealth is annuitized
median optimal consumption if 100% is invested in a nominal annuity
(a) Real consumption
































median optimal real wealth if 100% is invested in a real annuity
median optimal real wealth if no wealth is annuitized
median optimal real wealth if 100% is invested in a nominal annuity
(b) Real liquid wealth








































median optimal fraction invested in equity if 100% is invested in a real annuity
median optimal fraction invested in equity if no wealth is annuitized
median optimal wealth fraction in equity if 100% is invested in a nominal annuity
(c) Asset allocation
Figure 3: Optimal real consumption, optimal real wealth, and optimal asset allocation
Panel (a) displays the optimal real consumption for the optimal real annuitization level, optimal nominal annuitization
level, and without annuities. Panel (b) displays the optimal liquid real wealth for the optimal real annuitization level,
optimal nominal optimization level, and without annuities. Panel (c) presents the optimal fraction invested in the risky
asset for the optimal real annuitization level, optimal nominal optimization level, and without annuities. Expenses due
to background risk are included in the model. All numbers are in terms of the FRAI, which is the real annuity income
if 100% is invested in a real annuity.
123.2 Consumption, wealth, and asset allocation paths over the life cycle
The optimal consumption and wealth trajectories including the asset allocation rules are illustrated
in Figure 3. This ﬁgure presents the median consumption, wealth, and asset allocation for three
cases: (1) no annuitization, (2) 100% investment in nominal annuities, and (3) 100% investment in
real annuities.
Figure 3a shows that in case (1) and (2) the optimal consumption path is decreasing over time.
This reﬂects the fact that if the longevity risk in the real consumption level is not hedged, agents
do not plan much consumption at ages where the probability is high that one will have passed
away. If real annuities are used, inﬂation risk can be hedged and the planned consumption path
is approximately ﬂat (in real terms) because of the fact that the time preference parameter and
interest rates approximately coincide. Early in retirement, consumption is reduced to build up a
buffer against expenses due to background risk.
Figure 3b displays that only a relatively small amount of liquid wealth is accumulated if real
annuities are available. That level of liquid wealth is sufﬁcient to cover for unexpected shocks in
background risk, but there are no anticipatory savings due to inﬂation needed. The median liquid
wealth trajectory is very different if nominal annuities are used. In that case the individual saves
substantially out of the nominal annuity income and a median real wealth of 3.2 times the FRAI
is attained at the age of 80. This liquid capital is needed to have sufﬁcient real consumption if the
agent happens to get very old. This is in accordance with Love and Perozek (2007), who ﬁnd that
background risk increases the optimal amount of liquid assets.
Panel C of Figure 3 shows that the optimal fraction of liquid wealth invested in the risky asset,
if a person has annuitized nothing, is about 26% and is ﬁxed overtime. Instead the optimal fraction
is 100% if an individual has invested optimally in a real annuity. We see that the optimal fraction
depends negatively on the fraction of liquid wealth compared to total wealth (liquid wealth plus
discounted value of annuity income). This result is in line with Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout
(2005).
3.3 Savings strategies out of the real annuity income
The main idea of this paper is that full annuitization remains optimal if agents can save out of their
annuity income. In this section we examine this savings mechanism further. Figure 4 displays the
optimal real savings for varying real wealth levels, for the ages 70, 80, and 90. If an agent has a
wealth level of 1 times the FRAI and is 90 years old (crosses), savings are about 0.08 times the
FRAI. Put differently, the individual saves 8% out of his real annuity income to increase his buffer.
So even if an agent is 90-years old, if the buffer is insufﬁcient, savings are positive to increase it.
Furthermore we see that the amount of savings decreases with age, for a given wealth level. For a
13wealth level of one FRAI, the real savings are 17% for a 70 year old, 11% for a 80-year old, and
8% for a 90-year old.
From Figure4 we can also derivetheeffect of background risk on theamount ofsavings, which
is illustrated by the arrows. Consider a 90-year old agent with liquid wealth equal to one FRAI.
If this agent is hit by background risk and needs to pay expenses equal to 0.2 times the FRAI, his
wealth drops from 1 to 0.8 (left horizontal arrow). As a reaction to this the individual increases
savings from 8% of his annuity income to 20%. This increase in savings is substantial, because
the buffer that the retiree started with was not that high. If the agent has more wealth, the reaction
is less if the retiree is hit by the same background risk expenses, because the buffer is already
high. This can be seen from the arrows on the right, the speed with which the buffer is rebuild falls
with the wealth level. As a side effect, the ﬁgures illustrate the saving behavior of those with low
wealth. A 90-year old with a real annuity income and wealth less than 1.2 times the FRAI should
still save to hedge against background risk and inﬂation risk.





























Figure 4: Optimal savings for varying wealth levels when 100% is allocated to a real annuity
This ﬁgure shows the optimal real savings for varying levels of liquid real wealth if an agent invested his entire wealth
in a real annuity. We show the real savings for the ages 70, 80, and 90. All numbers are in terms of the FRAI, which
is the real annuity income if 100% is invested in a real annuity.
143.4 Savings strategies out of the nominal annuity income
Figure 5 analyzes in more detail the most striking result of Figure 3; the capital accumulation in
caseofnominalannuitization. Individualssaveoutofthenominalannuityincomeforfourdifferent
reasons. A ﬁrst reason is real consumption smoothing, because even deterministic inﬂation erodes
the real consumption that can be obtained from the nominal annuity income. A second reason
relates to inﬂation risk. Inﬂation risk generates precautionary savings as inﬂation risk can be seen
in this setting as a (partly) unhedgeable background risk. The third reason is precautionary saving
to hedge for the background risk in our model. The ﬁnal motivation is to accumulate capital to
capture the equity risk premium.




































Figure 5: Optimal real wealth trajectories when 100% is allocated to a nominal annuity
This ﬁgure shows the optimal liquid real wealth trajectories for ﬁve variations of the parameter values. These are the
wealth paths for an agent who invested his entire wealth at 65 in a nominal annuity. The liquid wealth trajectories
are for the case where 100% is invested in a nominal annuity. In the model setup where inﬂation risk is excluded, the
inﬂation level is ﬁxed at 3.48%. All numbers are in terms of the FRAI, which is the real annuity income if 100% is
invested in a real annuity. We set this Full Real Annuity Income equal to unity.
Figure 5 presents the optimal median wealth path for ﬁve different speciﬁcations of the model
to disentangle the different reasons for capital accumulation mentioned above. The solid line is
the median wealth path for the full model, which is the same as we displayed in Figure 3b. It’s
maximumvalueisabout3.2FRAIatage82. Todisentanglethefoureffects weremoveeachmotive
for savings separately. We examine the effect of the anticipatory motive by reducing the nominal
15interest rate and the equity return by 3.48% (the benchmark expected inﬂation rate) and setting the
mean inﬂation equal to zero while keeping the standard deviationof the instantaneousinﬂation rate
equal to 1.38%. If no deterministic inﬂation is incorporated (dashed line) the maximum amount
of wealth accumulated drops to 1.2 times the FRAI.5 Hence the largest part of the saving is due to
the ﬁrst motive; agents want to shift income from early in retirement to later. Furthermore we see
that the shape of the path of wealth differs substantially. The reason is that if the mean inﬂation
is zero, agents do not need to accumulate large amounts of wealth in the beginning of retirement
and dissave at later ages, to be able to have a smooth consumption pattern over the life. They only
need a buffer against background risk and inﬂation risk, and to get equity exposure. This buffer is
accumulated gradually over time to get a smooth consumption pattern. It is evident that hence the
level of inﬂation explains a substantial part of the results, but the other three factors also induce
savings.
In ordertoexaminetheeffect ofinﬂationrisk,wesetthestandarddeviationoftheinstantaneous
inﬂation rate and the standard deviation of the price index to zero. The optimal maximum savings
amount decreases with some 25% if inﬂation risk is taken out (from 3.2 times the FRAI to 2.4
times the FRAI). The level of precautionary savings is enhanced by the persistency in inﬂation.
The median savings is reduced from approximately 3.2 times the FRAI if all risk factors are
included to 2.7 times the full real annuity income, if agents cannot invest in equity. We examine
this effect by assuming that agents can only invest in the 1-year nominal bond. Hence the savings
are increased substantially to be able to obtain the equity risk premium.
If we assume agents do not face shocks due to background risk, the amount of savings is
slightly lower than 2.9 times the FRAI. Similarly, Palumbo (1999) and De Nardi, French, and
Jones (2009a) ﬁnd that uncertain medical expenses increases the amount of precautionary savings.
In sum, an individual could also simply annuitize less to keep wealth liquid and extract wealth
from the savings account to insure against inﬂation shocks. However, we ﬁnd that instead it is
optimal to annuitize fully to receive the mortality credit and subsequently save out of the annuity
income.
The previous paragraph shows different wealth paths for an agent who invested everything in
a nominal annuity, these where median wealth paths. However, it is also interesting to consider
consumption/savings strategies for wealth levels above or below the median. Figure 6 displays the
optimal consumption for varying wealth levels at age 70, 80, and 90, depending on the different
risk factors that an agent faces. Note that in Figure 4, we display the real savings on the y-axis,
while in Figure 6 we display real consumption. The dots are for the benchmark speciﬁcation,
5Note that this optimal wealth path is equal to the optimal wealth path when an agent receives an annuity in-
come which is increasing with the expected mean annual inﬂation. In several countries these increasing annuities are
available, but not sold that often.
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Figure 6: Optimal consumption for varying wealth levels when 100% is allocated to a nominal
annuity
The above panel displays the optimal real consumption for a 70 year old for several liquid real wealth levels. These
consumption/wealth strategies for an agent who invested is entire wealth at 65 in a nominal annuity. The liquid
real wealth levels are after annuity income and expenses due to background risk. Hence the real wealth level is the
disposable wealth level. The middle panel shows the optimal real consumption levels per real wealth level for a 80
year old and the lower panel for 90 year old. The parameters are that of the benchmark set up. All numbers are in
terms of the FRAI, which is the real annuity income if 100% is invested in a real annuity.
17hence agents save due to deterministic inﬂation, inﬂation risk, background risk, and to get equity
exposure. The real wealth level displayed on the horizontal axes is the remaining wealth after the
agent payed his expenses due to background risk and received the annuity income. If we look at
the upper panel for a 70-year old, we see that for the benchmark case if an agent has a wealth level
of 1.5 times the FRAI, consumption is equal to 0.82 times the FRAI. Furthermore, we see that
the consumption increases in the wealth level. If an agent cannot invest in equity, consumption
is similar for wealth levels below twice the FRAI, but less for higher wealth levels. The reason
for the lower consumption level is that the agent wants to have a larger amount of liquid wealth
to invest in equity. When we compare the real consumption levels when an agent does not face
background risk (crosses) with the benchmark case, we see that the consumption level is lower due
to the background risk. Furthermore we see that the real consumption level is reduced less due
to inﬂation risk. If there is no inﬂation risk (squares), agents with a wealth level of 1.5 consume
about0.87, comparedto0.82whenindividualsdofaceinﬂationrisk. Howeverifagentsdonothave
an anticipatory motive to save (circles), they increase consumption levels substantially. Moreover
these patterns of differences in real consumption,for different speciﬁcations of the model is similar
for a 70, 80, or 90 year-old. This can be seen by comparing the three panels of Figure 6.
The middle panel of Figure 6 shows the optimal real consumption for 80-year olds and the
lower panel for a 90-year old. There are several things apparent from these graphs. First of all,
we see that if the real wealth level is low, agents consume this entire amount. For instance, if
the wealth level of a 80-year old is about 0.5 times the FRAI, the individual consumes this entire
amount. Second, when comparing the three panels, we see that for a liquid real wealth level of
1.5, the real consumption negativelydepends on age. The reason is that the nominal income in real
terms decreases over time and the desired real consumption level falls because agents discount the
future more heavily due to the probability of dying.
3.5 Welfare gains of variable annuities
The literature has examined welfare gains due to variable annuities (see, e.g., Koijen, Nijman,
and Werker (2009b), and Horneff, Maurer, and Stamos (2008)). This section examines whether
adding variable annuities to the menu increases welfare sizeably in our setup with post-retirement
savings. Table 1 displays the welfare gains from allocating the optimal amount to a variable and
a real annuity, compared to only a real annuity. We see that the welfare gains are at most 1.5%.
Hence adding a variable annuity to the menu does not lead to a large increase of welfare if agents
save out of their annuity income to invest in equity. The combined optimal annuity portfolio for an
individual who faces background risk is only 10% in a variable annuity and the remaining wealth
in a real annuity. The reason is that individuals can save out of their annuity income to get equity
18exposure and real annuities provide a much better hedge against inﬂation risk than equity-linked
annuities.
AIR 4% AIR 2%
background risk included
welfare gain 1.2% 1.1%
optimal real/variable annuity 90/10 90/10
background risk excluded
welfare gain 1.5% 1.3%
optimal real/variable annuity 85/15 85/15
Table 1: Welfare gains (in %) of investing the optimal amount in a combination of variable and
real annuities compared to only real annuities
The assumed interest rate (AIR) is either 4% or 2%. The rest of the parameters are as in the benchmark case.
Koijen, Nijman, and Werker (2009b) ﬁnd an optimal allocation of 40% to variable annuities.
However, they do not include equity in the post-retirement asset menu. Hence, the only way
in which agents can get equity exposure, is via a variable annuity. For this reason the welfare
gains that they ﬁnd are much higher than ours. Similar reasoning holds for the contrasting re-
sults with Brown, Mitchell, and Poterba (1999). Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, and Stamos (2009)
ﬁnd a welfare gain of 6% at age 80 and 30% at age 40 of investing in variable annuities instead
of nominal annuities. They, however, assume that the asset allocation of the portfolio linked to
the variable annuity can vary over time and additional annuities can be bought every year. This
strand of literature includes annuities in the asset allocation menu, and agents decide how much
to invest in equity/bonds/annuities annually (Horneff, Maurer, and Stamos (2008) and Horneff,
Maurer, Mitchell, and Dus (2006)). In that case agents do not fully annuitize at age 65, to invest in
equity. As agents get older they gradually invest all their wealth in annuities, as they become more
attractive than equity due to the mortality credit.
4 Robustness tests on individual characteristics and ﬁnancial
market parameters
The evidence in the previous section suggests that background risk and an incomplete annuity
menu have at most only a small effect on optimal annuitization levels. Instead of annuitizing only
partially to get equity exposure and insure against background risk and inﬂation risk, it is found to
be optimal to allocate (almost) all your wealth to an annuity and save out of the annuity income
when desired. In this section, we calculate bounds on the possible bequest motive and default
risk of the insurer, such that our results still hold. Furthermore, we test whether our results are
19robust to alternative individual characteristics and ﬁnancial market parameters. We present results
for two benchmark cases: An individual who can freely invest in a real annuity and someone
who can freely invest in a nominal annuity. In all cases the other assumptions, including those on
background risk, are as before, unless explicitly stated otherwise.
4.1 Model speciﬁcation: bounds on the bequest motive and default risk
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Figure 7: Optimal annuitization for different parameters of the bequest motive
Panel (a) displays the bounds on the bequest motive parameters for which full annuitization holds, when an agent can
investinanominalannuity. Panel(b)displaystheboundsonthebequestmotiveparametersforwhichfullannuitization
holds, when an agent can invest in a real annuity. A higher strength of the bequest motive ¯ w gives incentives to
annuitize less, while a higher luxury parameter φ gives incentives to annuitize more. The other parameters are those
of the benchmark.
We investigate the robustness of the results when agents have a bequest motive. Following
Ameriks, Caplin, Laufer, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2009) and De Nardi, French, and Jones (2009b),










where ¯ w is the strength of the bequest motive and φ is the prevalence in the population of an
bequest motive. φ determines the curvature of the bequest motive and hence the extent to which
bequests are a luxury good. To get a better understanding of the meaning of the bequest parameters
we present in Appendix A the optimalbequest in a simpliﬁedmodel that can besolved analytically.
A bequest motivecan give individualsan incentiveto annuitize less, because in case of early death,
the retiree may not have had enough time to build up enough wealth to bequeath. If an agent dies
at more advanced ages, the individual saves out of the annuity income to leave a bequest as before.
Figure 7 shows for which values of the two bequest parameters ( ¯ w and φ) full annuitizationstill
holds. The effect of both parameters on the optimal annuity demand is in opposite directions. A
higher strength of the bequest motive ¯ w gives an incentive to annuitize less, while a higher luxury
good parameter φ increases the incentives to fully annuitize. Panel a presents the results in case
that nominal annuities are available. Wee see that in almost all cases full annuitization remains
optimal. Only when the luxury parameter φ is $2000 (0.09 times the FRAI) or lower and the
strength of the bequest motive φ is above 16, the optimal annuity demand falls. De Nardi, French,
and Jones (2009b) ﬁnd a ¯ w (strength of the bequest motive) equal to 2.5 and Ameriks, Caplin,
Laufer, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2009) estimate a ¯ w of 16 and a luxury parameters φ of $5000. For
these parameters, full annuitization in a nominal annuity is optimal. It is optimal to annuitize your
entire wealth and save to build up a buffer and leave it is as a bequest.
Panel (b) in Figure 7 displays the bounds on the parameters for the bequest motive, when an
agent can buy real annuities. In this case we see that for more values of the bequest parameters, full
annuitization is sub-optimal. The reason is that the annuity income in the ﬁrst years of retirement
is higher for the nominal annuity than for the real annuity. The nominal annuity is front-loaded in
real terms. For this reason the agent can build up a sufﬁcient buffer faster when receiving a nom-
inal annuity income, to leave as a bequest in case of death already early in retirement. De Nardi,
French, and Jones (2009b) found a bequest parameter, ¯ w, of 2.5, hence full annuitization still
holds. Ameriks, Caplin, Laufer, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2009) found a much higher estimate of
the strength of the bequest motive ¯ w of 16 and a luxury parameter φ of $5000. For this param-
eter conﬁguration full annuitization is no longer optimal. However if we calculate the optimal
consumption and bequest in a riskless world for these parameters, we would ﬁnd an optimal con-
sumption of about $11,500 annually and a bequest of almost $105,000. The agent would reduce
his annual consumption from $16,750 to $11,500 to leave a bequest. In appendix A the optimal
consumption and bequest is derived for a simple model without risk.
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(a) Default risk: nominal annuity
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Figure 8: Optimal annuitization with default risk
Panel (a) displays the bounds on the default risk parameters for which full annuitization holds, when an agent can
invest in a nominal annuity. Panel (b) displays the bounds on the default risk parameters for which full annuitization
holds, when an agent can invest in a real annuity. A higher default probability gives incentives to annuitize less, while
a higher guarantee gives incentives to annuitize more. The other parameters are those of the benchmark.
22Another reason why agents might not want to annuitize, so that our results would not hold, is
default risk of the seller of the annuity. We assume that in case the annuity provider defaults, the
agent gets (part) of the present value of the annuity back. First of all, after a default, part of the
value of the company is recovered, so the recovery rate is more than 0%. Second, if the amount
recovered from the insurer is less than the guarantee of the state, then this amount is supplemented
up to the guaranteed amount. In most states in the U.S. at least $100,000 is guaranteed and the
maximum is $500,000 (Babbel and Merril (2007)). So even if the insurer goes bankrupt and the
recovery value is low, the annuitant gets at least $100,000 of the present value of the annuity back.
We assume that the agent gets a guarantee from the state of $100,000.
In Figure 8 we display the bounds on the default risk parameters for which full annuitization
holds. The vertical axes in Figure 8 speciﬁes which fraction is recovered in case of default. If this
recovery rate times the present value of the annuity is less than $100,000 (and the present value of
the annuity is more than $100,000), we assume the state guarantee supplements this amount up to
$100,000. The horizontal axes displays the default probability. First of all we see that the bounds
differ substantially depending on the type of annuity the agent has; nominal or real. If an agent has
a real annuity income, almost always full annuitization is optimal, while if the individual can only
invest in a nominal annuity, the optimal annuitization can potentially fall if the default probability
gets high. The reason is that the nominal annuity is less welfare enhancing than the real annuity,
hence there are more incentives to decrease the annuity level when the default risk is high. Second
we see that the fraction of wealth recovered is important for the optimal annuity demand, which
is similar to the ﬁndings of Babbel and Merril (2007). In this paper we normalized all numbers
in terms of the Full Real Annuity Income, but the wealth that was used as a basis is $335,000,
which is the median total wealth level at 65. Hence 33.5% of the value of the annuity at 65 is
guaranteed by the state. When we compare the default probabilities in the graph with the actual
default probabilities for corporates from Moody’s, we ﬁnd that full annuitization always holds.
Namely the default probability for corporates up to a rating of Baa is only 16 bp.
Parameter setup Optimal level Optimal level
real annuities nominal annuities
Benchmark parameters 96 100
Mean gross equity return 10% instead of 8% 93 100
Subsistence consumption level 0.5 instead of 0.25 FRAI 94 100
Mean expenses due to background risk 0.2 instead of 0.1 FRAI 91 100
Expense factor 7.3% instead of 0% 94 100
Risk aversion coefﬁcient 2 instead of 5 92 100
Table 2: Robustness tests
The table reportsthe optimalannuitizationlevels (in %) forseveral alternativeparameterchoices. Foreveryrobustness
check one parameter is changed and the rest remains at their benchmark value.
234.2 Robustness tests
As a ﬁrst robustness check we increase the equity premium to an expected stock return of 10%
rather than 8%. Not surprisingly this implies a reduction in annuity demand, but the numerical
effect is small. The optimal demand for real annuities reduces from 96% to 93%. For the nominal
annuity case, full optimization always remains optimal. As a subsequent test we doubled the
subsistence consumption level to examine whether this alters the optimal level, Table 2 shows that
this is hardly the case.
As another check for robustness the mean (real) expenses due to background risk have been
doubled from 10% to 20% of the full real annuity income. Moreover the standard deviation was
doubled as well. The optimal level allocated to a real annuity decreases from 96% to 91%. Again
the direction of the effect is as expected, but the numerical differences are small.
In addition we consider the effect on optimal annuitization of including a load factor on the
annuity income. The load factor was set at 7.3% in line with Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky, and
Brown (1999). The optimal annuitization level falls by only 2%. Naturally the welfare loss of the
load is large, 8.5%.6 Finally a less risk averse individual (γ = 2) invests 92% of his initial wealth
in real annuities. Thus the change in the optimal annuitization level is quantitatively small and the
previous results are also robust for an alternative risk preference.
5 Conclusion
This paper analyzes whether optimal annuity demand is affected by incomplete annuity markets
and background risk. If no variable annuities are available and borrowing constraints are imposed,
it can potentially be optimal to annuitize only a part of your wealth in such a setup. However,
we ﬁnd that (almost) full annuitization remains optimal, irrespective of whether nominal or real
annuities are available if agents save adequately out of their annuity income. In case of nominal
annuities, the agent will save considerably out of the annuity income during retirement to gain
equity exposure and hedge against background and inﬂation risk. If an individual receives a real
annuity income, the agent saves a smaller amount as a buffer against (real) background risk. In all
cases (close to) full annuitization at age 65 remains optimal. As a side result, we ﬁnd that access to
variable annuities is less welfare enhancing than previously found in the literature. The argument
is similar: the buffer saved can be used to get sufﬁcient equity exposure. These results are robust
for realistic parameters of a bequest motive and default risk of the annuity seller.
6This result is not presented in the paper. The percentage welfare loss is larger than the load, because the amount
of income after paying the expenses due to background risk falls by a larger percentage than the load. The income
available for consumption does not scale down by the load percentage, due to the expenses for background risk.
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A Optimal bequest in a riskless world
Assume an agent starts with an amount of wealth W, and does not face longevity risk. Each
year the individual consumes C for T years and derives utility equal to C1−γ/(1 − γ). At death,
the retiree leaves a bequest B equal to (W − CT) and derives utility from bequest equal to
( ¯ w/(1 − γ))(φ + Bt ¯ w)
1−γ. The agent chooses C optimally, to maximize total utility from con-
sumption and the bequest. When differentiating total utility with respect to consumption, the re-
sulting optimalconsumption is C = (W + ¯ wφ)/( ¯ w+T) and the optimal bequest is B = ¯ w(C−φ).
27Hence the agent leaves a bequest to cover ¯ w years of spending for the heir at an annual expenditure
level (C −φ), the amount by which his own optimal annual consumption exceeds the threshold φ.
If W is too low to ensure an income stream for the heir higher than φ for ¯ w years, no bequest is
left.
28